shapeofsoup
  • Monotropic Expansion
  • 1. Introduction
    • 1.1 Prevailing Deficit Framework
    • 1.2 Purpose and Goals
    • 1.3 Monotropic Expansion Model
    • 1.4 Addressing Accessibility
    • 1.5 Paper Overview
    • 1.6 Positionality and Rationale
  • 2. Model Mechanism
    • 2.1 Anchoring
    • 2.2 Iterative Context Building
    • 2.3 Cognitive Inertia
    • 2.4 Directionality and Precision
    • 2.5 Scalability and Flexibility
  • 3. Neurological Foundation
    • 3.1 Salience Anchoring and Internal Relevance
    • 3.2 Attentional Modulation and Cognitive Inertia
    • 3.3 Predictive Coding and Inside-Out Construction
    • 3.4 Neurodevelopmental Trajectories and Structural Divergence
    • 3.5 Implications for Structural Modeling and Neuroethical Practice
  • 4. Theoretical Alignment
    • 4.1 Monotropism (Murray, Lesser, Lawson, 2005)
    • 4.2 Executive Dysfunction and Attentional Flexibility
    • 4.3. Weak Central Coherence (Frith, 1989)
    • 4.4. Theory of Mind (ToM) and the Assumption of Deficiency
    • 4.5. Language Processing and Internal Narrative
    • 4.6. Trauma, Inertia, and Pattern Reinforcement
    • 4.7. Double Empathy Problem (Milton, 2012)
    • 4.8. DSM-5 Framing and Pathologized Comparison
  • 5. Implications
    • 5.1. Diagnostic Framing and the Myth of Functioning Labels
    • 5.2. Coexisting Neurodivergent Conditions and Inertial Structures
    • 5.3. Rethinking Support and Accommodation
    • 5.4. Therapy Approaches, Cognitive Models, and Ethical Misalignment
    • 5.5. Self-Perception, Identity, and Communication Disconnects
    • 5.6. Social Systems, Education, and Institutional Friction
  • 6. Reframing Autism
    • 6.1. The Structural Model of Divergence
    • 6.2. Moving Beyond Developmental Language
    • 6.3. Implications for Language, Ethics, and Research
  • 7. Conclusion
  • 8. Update Log
  • Contact & Support
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4.4. Theory of Mind (ToM) and the Assumption of Deficiency

The traditional Theory of Mind framework posits that autistic individuals lack the ability to infer the mental states of others. Monotropic Expansion does not attempt to rehabilitate this theory—instead, it directly challenges its foundation.

Difficulty understanding others’ perspectives is not always a failure of empathy or cognition, but a mismatch in contextual anchoring—that is, the starting point from which each individual constructs meaning and relevance. Autistic individuals may be expanding thought from a very different starting point, leading to conclusions that feel misaligned from the outside, but internally valid and coherent.

This model reframes social friction as an outcome of directional dissonance—where cognitive flow paths are incompatible, not broken. It also explains why autistic individuals often report deep insight or hyper-empathy when given time and context to work through interactions on their own terms. It supports the notion that social cognition may be present but differently structured and accessed.

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Last updated 2 months ago