shapeofsoup
  • Monotropic Expansion
  • 1. Introduction
    • 1.1 Prevailing Deficit Framework
    • 1.2 Purpose and Goals
    • 1.3 Monotropic Expansion Model
    • 1.4 Addressing Accessibility
    • 1.5 Paper Overview
    • 1.6 Positionality and Rationale
  • 2. Model Mechanism
    • 2.1 Anchoring
    • 2.2 Iterative Context Building
    • 2.3 Cognitive Inertia
    • 2.4 Directionality and Precision
    • 2.5 Scalability and Flexibility
  • 3. Neurological Foundation
    • 3.1 Salience Anchoring and Internal Relevance
    • 3.2 Attentional Modulation and Cognitive Inertia
    • 3.3 Predictive Coding and Inside-Out Construction
    • 3.4 Neurodevelopmental Trajectories and Structural Divergence
    • 3.5 Implications for Structural Modeling and Neuroethical Practice
  • 4. Theoretical Alignment
    • 4.1 Monotropism (Murray, Lesser, Lawson, 2005)
    • 4.2 Executive Dysfunction and Attentional Flexibility
    • 4.3. Weak Central Coherence (Frith, 1989)
    • 4.4. Theory of Mind (ToM) and the Assumption of Deficiency
    • 4.5. Language Processing and Internal Narrative
    • 4.6. Trauma, Inertia, and Pattern Reinforcement
    • 4.7. Double Empathy Problem (Milton, 2012)
    • 4.8. DSM-5 Framing and Pathologized Comparison
  • 5. Implications
    • 5.1. Diagnostic Framing and the Myth of Functioning Labels
    • 5.2. Coexisting Neurodivergent Conditions and Inertial Structures
    • 5.3. Rethinking Support and Accommodation
    • 5.4. Therapy Approaches, Cognitive Models, and Ethical Misalignment
    • 5.5. Self-Perception, Identity, and Communication Disconnects
    • 5.6. Social Systems, Education, and Institutional Friction
  • 6. Reframing Autism
    • 6.1. The Structural Model of Divergence
    • 6.2. Moving Beyond Developmental Language
    • 6.3. Implications for Language, Ethics, and Research
  • 7. Conclusion
  • 8. Update Log
  • Contact & Support
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4.8. DSM-5 Framing and Pathologized Comparison

Autism’s clinical definition in the DSM-5 remains rooted in behavioral observation and deficit comparison. The model is defined by what autistic individuals are perceived not to do, such as maintaining eye contact, engaging in small talk, or transitioning easily between tasks.

Monotropic Expansion critiques this framing at its root. These “deficits” are better understood as the observable consequences of monotropic cognition in environments and systems optimized for polytropic behavior. The model proposes that behaviors listed in the DSM are surface-level artifacts of a different cognitive orientation—not impairments in themselves.

This critique is not merely philosophical—it is foundational. Monotropic Expansion positions autism not as a disorder of development, but as a structurally divergent cognitive mode. The implications are both theoretical and practical: the model encourages the development of support systems, educational tools, and diagnostic criteria that are aligned with how autistic cognition actually functions, rather than how it diverges from neurotypical norms.

Taken together, these comparisons reveal that Monotropic Expansion does not discard prior theories—it clarifies and reorganizes them within a more accurate structural model. It provides a scalable, directionally grounded framework for understanding how autistic cognition functions, and why external behaviors alone are an insufficient measure of cognitive integrity.

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Last updated 2 months ago