shapeofsoup
  • Monotropic Expansion
  • 1. Introduction
    • 1.1 Prevailing Deficit Framework
    • 1.2 Purpose and Goals
    • 1.3 Monotropic Expansion Model
    • 1.4 Addressing Accessibility
    • 1.5 Paper Overview
    • 1.6 Positionality and Rationale
  • 2. Model Mechanism
    • 2.1 Anchoring
    • 2.2 Iterative Context Building
    • 2.3 Cognitive Inertia
    • 2.4 Directionality and Precision
    • 2.5 Scalability and Flexibility
  • 3. Neurological Foundation
    • 3.1 Salience Anchoring and Internal Relevance
    • 3.2 Attentional Modulation and Cognitive Inertia
    • 3.3 Predictive Coding and Inside-Out Construction
    • 3.4 Neurodevelopmental Trajectories and Structural Divergence
    • 3.5 Implications for Structural Modeling and Neuroethical Practice
  • 4. Theoretical Alignment
    • 4.1 Monotropism (Murray, Lesser, Lawson, 2005)
    • 4.2 Executive Dysfunction and Attentional Flexibility
    • 4.3. Weak Central Coherence (Frith, 1989)
    • 4.4. Theory of Mind (ToM) and the Assumption of Deficiency
    • 4.5. Language Processing and Internal Narrative
    • 4.6. Trauma, Inertia, and Pattern Reinforcement
    • 4.7. Double Empathy Problem (Milton, 2012)
    • 4.8. DSM-5 Framing and Pathologized Comparison
  • 5. Implications
    • 5.1. Diagnostic Framing and the Myth of Functioning Labels
    • 5.2. Coexisting Neurodivergent Conditions and Inertial Structures
    • 5.3. Rethinking Support and Accommodation
    • 5.4. Therapy Approaches, Cognitive Models, and Ethical Misalignment
    • 5.5. Self-Perception, Identity, and Communication Disconnects
    • 5.6. Social Systems, Education, and Institutional Friction
  • 6. Reframing Autism
    • 6.1. The Structural Model of Divergence
    • 6.2. Moving Beyond Developmental Language
    • 6.3. Implications for Language, Ethics, and Research
  • 7. Conclusion
  • 8. Update Log
  • Contact & Support
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5.1. Diagnostic Framing and the Myth of Functioning Labels

Current diagnostic language surrounding autism continues to reflect an externalized, behavior-first paradigm that prioritizes observable traits over internal cognitive structure. Terms like high-functioning, low-functioning, or Level 1–3 support needs flatten the complexity of autistic experience into a perceived relationship to independence, productivity, or compliance—none of which reflect the actual cognitive mechanisms at play. These frameworks implicitly assess individuals against a norm-centered scale of deviation rather than recognizing structural divergence in cognitive orientation.

The term profound autism, recently introduced in some research and advocacy circles, compounds this issue. While it purports to differentiate individuals with higher support needs, it instead reinforces the misconception that greater external challenges signal a deeper or more severe form of autism. In reality, many of the struggles seen in individuals labeled “profoundly autistic” may result not from autism itself, but from co-occurring intellectual disability, environmental trauma, nonspeaking presentation, or inconsistent access to meaningful support. The Monotropic Expansion model helps clarify that autism is not a scale of function or a measure of deficit—it is a directional cognitive orientation that exists independently of the challenges layered upon it.

Support needs should therefore be framed in terms of inertial mismatch between a person’s cognitive directionality and the demands or expectations of their environment—not as a metric of internal limitation. In this light, the most useful diagnostic reform would center structural cognition over behavioral comparison and abandon terms that imply internal hierarchy or progression.

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Last updated 2 months ago